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Doubting and Believing: The Hermeneutics of
Suspicion in Contexts of Faith
C. Jan Swearingen
eligious and cultural conservatism currently enjoys much press and some

R praise. In contrast, many corners of our intellectual and academic worlds

promote what Stephen Carter ( 1 993) has termed a "culture of disbelief." Current
practices of teaching writing and interpretation in the academy exemplify this
culture. Academics i n several fields focus on unmasking hidden and illusory
meanings, on revealing private personal pathologies and larger cultural wrongs.
Some literary theorists openly recommend avoiding conviction and propose only
hesitant, qualified modes of reasoning and writing lest conviction lead to dogma
tism (Hartman, 1 9 9 1 ) . "The best lack all conviction; while the worst/ Are full of
passionate intensity" (Yeats, 1 986, p. 9 1 ) .
The current academic "doubting game" (Elbow, 1 986) is sustained by the
practice of "in terrograting" cultural values and paradigms. The doctri naire
quality of this belief system confronts students when they arrive at colleges and
universities with diverse convictions that-despite their differences from one
another-differ even more radically from the skepticism that is the required mode
of thinking, read i n g , and writing in many univers ities' English curricula.
Because the relationship between the life of the mind and the resources of belief
has received so little attention in academic and scholarly circles, and because a
diversity of cultural values and beliefs about learning are manifest among today' s
college s tude n t s , I propose t h a t i t i s t i m e to renew o u r attention to the
relationships among belief and knowledge, skepticism and learning, education
and obligatory doubt.
Rightly and wrongly, students rej ect or are confused by academic pedagogies
and scholarly goals that focus relentlessly on skepticism and adversarial debate.
As writers and readers, as teachers of writing and ways of reading, how should
we expand the repertoire of analytic methods and practices that we employ? How
can we reintegrate the valuable rigors of the life of the mind with the ability to
read with the eyes of faith? The renowned Marxist teacher and activist Paolo
Freire, for example, was also a committed Jesuit missionary. Can we not con
tinue to applaud his liberatory pedagogy and begin to remember the religious
convictions that inspired his teaching? Peter Elbow ( 1 986) has defended the "be
lieving game" alongside and in dialectical relationship with the "doubting game"
familiar to academicians, as a more comfortable starting point for many student
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readers and writers. Similarly, Mary Belenky and her colleagues ( 1986) noted
that a certain loss of faith accompanied the entry into the college classroom cul
ture of the working class women they studied. Many of the students, upon learn
ing to reject received and previously unquestioned authority became for a time
radical skeptics and individualists, "separated learners." In Belenky's account,
some never recovered from this radical epistemological isolation, from the loss
of faith which is also a loss of self.
Blind faith in religious or political doctrines should not be conflated with
faith in oneself, one's activities, and the formation of a self that ground educa
tion, writing, and reading for many teachers and students. Can we improve on the
crude understanding of religious belief and conviction as somehow indelibly
anti-intellectual that is, itself, too often an unexamined article of faith within the
academy (Carter, 1993; Holmes, 1993; Wills, 1990)? Can we develop related in
sights that will help us dismantle the political dogmatisms of the left and the
right that within and outside the academy increasingly foreclose discussion of
diverse views, even while claiming to defend diversity? I turn to a investigation
of how we might begin to answer such questions.

Lead Us Not into Conclusion:
The Academy's Paradoxical Faith in Skepticism
Literary critic Gerald Graff ( 1990) defends "the culture wars" and propounds
"teaching the conflicts." Others ask whether recent critical theories-the
hermeneutics of suspicion, deconstruction, and postmodernism-mean that the
discovery and articulation of truth and meaning is no longer a valid aim of inter
pretation (Torgovnick, 1993). Should criticism and interpretation, the guiding
forces behind the teaching of reading and writing, be so singularly devoted to
questioning all bases of judgment and to a hermeneutics guided by suspicion of
discovered or constructed meaning, indeed, of concluding anything at all? Con
cerns about the perils of negative dialectics, aimless deconstruction, and an
unrestrained emphasis on abstract and analytic thought have been advanced by
critics from unexpectedly different camps. Feminist scholars, postmodern
theorists, and multiculturalists have converged on one point. For very different
reasons they warn that outside of carefully defined purposes-such as criticism
that is clearly directed at improved understanding-the relentless interrogation
of received beliefs and the practices of skepticism, debate, and negative dialectic
can lead scholars and students alike to become "expressionless, pitiless, unteach
able ... incapable of belief" (Wolf, 1984, p. 136). Like the separated learners
that Belenky et at. (1986) characterize, such individuals in their radical skepti
cism can become alienated from the larger communities, including communities
of belief, in which they might renegotiate themselves and their futures.
Further compounding the emphasis on doubt rather than on belief, the indi
vidual rather than the collective, the legacies of Marx and Freud have left us with
a hermeneutics of suspicion, the habit of interpretive skepticism that questions
any apparent or received meanings as possibly and even probably illusory. Marxian
and Freudian theories guide practitioners in cultural studies, where approaches
to race, class, and gender, alongside deconstructionist readings of texts, assume
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that the culture, the author, or the reader have something deep to hide. The reader
in these models of textual interpretation becomes the analyst of a situation that is
assumed to be pathological from the onset. We have observed how easily such
readings erode into victim narratives: stories of how an individual character or
auth or or ethnic group was oppressed by an elitist culture, sadistic parent, or evil
overlord. Freudian theories of individual identity and Marxist theories of cul
tural structure have, since early i n this century, advanced the views that religion
is delusory and narcotic, that belief is illusory, and that hope is naive.
These not-so-old hermeneutic habits die hard; the cultures of disbelief still
outweigh the cultures of belief within the academy. But they are being countered
in debates about academic personality styles, models of consciousness, ways of
knowing, and ways of writing. Reappraisals of academic modes have i n turn
sparked renewed attention to the nature of argumentation, conflict, and contro
versy-extending the ongoing dialectic between controversy and dialogue within
philosophy and philosophical hermeneutics (Maranhao, 1986; Swearingen, 1 990).
By the individualist measure of intellectual rigor, dialogue and reading for un
derstanding are typically deemed "soft" and epistemologically incorrect. Why?
Because notions of classroom dialogues and of the reading of literature as dia
logic assume that there can be authentic exchanges between individuals, that there
can be edifying discourses (Marino, 1 993). Such models have been repeatedly
questioned and even scorned in postmodern theory. Nonetheless, as an instru
ment of classroom learning and discussion, the dialogic paradigm is far more
comfortable than debate and programmatic skepticism to many students, to many
women in Western culture (Belenky et a!., 1 986), and to many non-Westerners
(Gates, 1 993; Ong, 1 992; Said, 1 99 1 ).
As the academy becomes increasingly multicultural and interdisciplinary, it
is expanding and realigning its repertoire, and diversifying its models of thought,
identity, ways of thinking, knowing, interpreting, meaning , and writing (Gates,
1 993). Jerome Bruner ( 1 986) observes that the Western educated self is only one
among many possible "canonical images of selfhood" within as well as outside
the academy (p. 130). The traditional Western individualist model of self and
voice contrasts sharply with the social, collective phenomenology of knowledge,
thought, and composition that many nontraditional students bring with them into
today's classrooms. Individuals from cultures where learning takes place in groups
tacitly believe in themselves-and in their learning-partaking in a shared con
sciousness and pursuing a collectively acquired wisdom. Such learners believe
themselves to be inheritors of a legacy rather than as forgers of new, original
revolutionary thinking. These are not simply nontraditional student beliefs and
practices; they are evidence of intellectual traditions that are entering into today 's
academy and changing it. Even among the oldest Western traditions can be ob
served similar beliefs in collective knowledge alongside the more familiar and
more emphasized paradigms of i ndividual autonomy and analytic thought.
Socrates' "know thyself'' came to mean "separate yourself from the Other"
( Kierkegaard, 1 966, p. 202). Socrates' contemporary Epictetus ( 1 962) understood
the same enjoinder in an irreducibly collective sense: "Bid a singer in the Chorus
'know thyself' and will he not turn for the knowledge to the others, his fellows
in the chorus, and to his harmony with them?" (3: 1 4).
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A l ternatives to individualism and skepticism may be found i n Western aca
demic paradigms of Socratic dialogue ( Kierkegaard's portrait of Socrates not
withstanding) and in hermeneutic practices directed at constructing collabora
tive meaning. These practices of thought and language have long emphasized
interactional and collective models of mind, discourse, self, and meaning. How
ever, these collaborative practices have often held a minority position i n relation
to the programmatic doubt and to the analytic modes that, since Descartes, have
dominated the Western academy and its values.
Despite i ts reputation for spawning culture wars and promoting skeptici sm,
the current multicultural academic setting can be particularly hospitable to dia
logue and di alogical hermeneutics, ways of knowing and learning in the academy
that have long provided alternatives and complements to skeptici sm, analytic dia
lectic, and doctrines of linguistic contingency (Gates, 1 992). Truth-building modes
of discourse have never been entirely absent from academic models; indeed, they
i l l u s trate that b e l ief, and even faith, need not and s hould not be regarded
reductively or as e nemies of rea son (Carter, 1 993; Ong, 1 9 9 1). Reading with the
eyes of faith is an activity that secular Romantic aesthetics borrowed from Prot
estant hermeneutics in the late eighteenth century. The ability to read with, and
as, is a believing game (Elbow, 1 986) firmly grounded in literary aesthetics such
as the Romantic poet Coleridge's notion that reading and appreciating poetry re
quires a willing suspension of disbelief, an edifying suspension of skepticism.
Dialogue, thus understood, has long functioned as a classroom paradigm without
dimin i shing or impeding the merits of skepticism and analysis. The academy 's
modes of thought and language can and should b e renewed by rehabilitating a
positive, constructive di alectical relationship between belief and dialogue, on
the one hand, and the discourses of analy sis and debate, on the other. Orchestrat
ing diverse academic models could lead to intellectual multiculturalism in place
of culture wars. If the academy's models were realigned to become less hostile to
the worlds of belief, conviction, and reasoned action where most people spend
most of their time, we might experience less difficulty, for example, i n apologiz
ing for or defending academic writing.

Reading Literature Through the Eyes of Faith
Writing In Hopes of Becoming
L iterary study is rapidly changing, both as an object of classroom and schol
arly interpretation, and as a repertoire of models for classroom and scholarly
discourses. How we teach reading and how we teach writing are firmly linked i n
t h i s movement. A s li terary, social, a n d cultural studies mingle i n a multicultural
academic environme nt, reading with the eyes of faith-faith in what we will be
come and should envision-can perhaps become a more acceptable epistemol
ogy. Such reading, in turn, has the potential to create writers and writings that
beg i n to generate new canons of self and knowledge.
Serious attention to literature as a guide to intellectual and moral develop
ment is a belief-guided interpretive practice as old as the English and German
Romantic concept of the bildungsroman-the novel as a paradigm of character
development. The notion of l iterature as model and guide to the development of
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identity is assuming renewed importance i n a multicultural academy striving to
define common grounds and values among its diverse constituencies. Although
recent literary theory and aesthetics have often emphasized literature's strategic
indeterminacy and status as beguiling fiction, it has also been approached in many
times and places as a vehic le for making cultural and personal meanings by both
readers and characters. Through their stories and through adult models all cul
tures present children with "canonical images of sel fhood" (Bruner, 1986, p. 130).
In the first cl assrooms of modern Western democracies, l iterary study was de
fined as an equalizing curriculum-a set of models of character and voice that
would be shared by all students.
In the c lassrooms of the first Western democracies l iterary study was de
fined as an equalizing resource for the formation of self. Recuperating this model
of l iterature as a model for identity can help extend the academic selves and
voices we already propound to larger and increasingly diverse coll ege student
constituencies. Approached as a source of images of self and as a representation
of intellectual discourses, literature, and the talk about literature modeled by teach
ers, becomes more than mere fiction, more than a trivial diversion or bell etristic
entertainment, and more than a ruthless exercise in cynic ally dismantling mean
ing and authorial personality. Literature, and the teacher's modeling of talk about
literature, can also assume the roles of supplements to identity, training grounds
for thought, models for language, and sites for reviving belief.
An ancient defense of belief working in accord with inte llect posited that
inte l l e ctual activity is, and should b e , faith seeking understanding, belief
creating a space conducive to thought and insight: credo ut intelligam. Such a
model presents faith-in a higher being, or God-and be lief-in commonly held
doctrines, concepts, and valu es-as working hand in hand with reason and the
intellect. In the Prometheus and Faust legends it is faith-in the gods, in the
shared, constructed, common values of tradition-that must temper the potential
arrogance of unguided rationality and excessive anthropocentrism.
We need not persist in treating faith as blind and belief as a primitive age of
innocence-as stages in a developmental continuum in which true advancement
is marked by the abandonment of belief and superstition, and the triumph of pure
rational analytic thought. Compulsory skepticism; promoted as an end in itself,
is perceived by many students as mystifying and repressive b y many inside as
well as outside the academy (Gates, 199 3 ; Murphy, 1993; Phelps, 1 99 2 ) . Doctri
naire skepticism shou l d continue to be tempe red by the recuperation of
belief-grounded learning based on coll ective social values. As this happens, the
roles played by character, speaker, and author in literary study will be ill umi
nated by new lights and seen through new lenses. Reprisals of the rel ationships
among belief, collective social values, and the many roles of character, speaker,
and author that we find in l iterary representations can help in the process. Recent
pedagogical applic ations of this defense of skepticism have been chall enged on
the grounds that denying epistemological and social agency to groups who have
long been marginalized is hardly an acceptable academic purpose (Gates, 199 3 ;
Murphy, 199 3 ; Phelps, 1992). As writers, as readers, and as characters i n recent
literature, women and minorities seek to be more in the picture, more in the text,
and more part of the discussion, not less so.
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Alternative models of metacognitive and metalinguistic self-consciousness
are often only implicit in cultures and literatures. Of the priestess's voice that
speaks out of and to a collective culture, Christa Wolf 's (1984) Cassandra says,
"We have no name for what spoke out of me" (p. l07). Western philosophy and
language theory have made names for what speaks: explicit, mandatory vehicles
of thought and instruction. The Western separated self is able to refer explicitly
to my identity, my position, but it is becoming increasingly clear in cross-cultural
studies of identity and intellect that this self is only one among a nu mber of pos
sible selves, voices, and self images. The proximal learning accomplished by
identifying with models that has been observed in early childhood development
is true of identifying with literary characters and with teachers as well. Classical
rhetorics, in their own multicultural milieus, were well aware of this when they
emphasized imitation and mimesis as primary vehicles for learning ways of think
ing, ways of speaking, ways of reading, and ways of writing. Jerome Bruner (1 986)
observes, "An Anlage of metac�gnition is present as early as the eighteenth month
of life. How much and in what form it develops will depend upon the demands of
the culture in which one lives-represented by particular others one encounters
and by some notion of generalized other that one forms" (p. 67 ). Studies of proxi
mal learning, identity formation, belief, and faith enhance a growing understand
ing that selfhood and agency are best developed-by many individuals in many
different cultures-from within the circles of community and belief, contexts that
should never be forcibly removed.
What uses can the academy make of these insights drawn from cross cultural
studies of development? The academy has already begun to benefit from an
expanded repertoire of models of selfhood, identity, and intellect as it becomes
increasingly multicultural. However, an overly literal-minded, reductive
panoply of canonical selves and identities

-

w omen ,

Black/African/African

American, Asian, or, all lumped together, nontraditional-has already produced
a fissured politics of identity that is troublingly conducive to a "self-esteem school
of pedagogy, a view of education as a sort of twelve-step program for recovery"
(Gates, 1992, p. 36). Edward Said ( 199 1) warns against the dangers of reductive
essentialism along similar lines. "To say that women should read mainly women's
literature, that Blacks should study and perfect only Black techniques of under
standing and interpretation, that Arabs and Muslims should return to the Holy
Book for all knowledge and wisdom is the inverse of saying along with Carlyle
and Gobineau that all the lesser races must retain their inferior status in the world"
(p. 17). Newly formed cultural identities that are being shaped within revised
academic curricula have been defended primarily on the grounds that they pro
mote belief in oneself, defined as self-esteem. This basis for curricular revision
confuses the strong evidence that school achievement is causally related to self
esteem with the paucity of evidence that self esteem is related to school achieve
ment. "When Laotian students in California ace their exams it isn't because the
curriculum reinforces a rich sense of their Laotian cultural heritage" (Gates, 1992,
p. 36). The development of new curricula in writing and literature should be given
goals in addition to self-esteem. Multicultural curricular reform needs no further
defense, but it begs for orchestration.
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Libretto for a New Canon
Proponents of various writing pedagogies, critical thinking modeis, and
literary critical theories have recently engaged in disputes concerning agency,
epistemology, and the nature and value of controversy within the academy
(Graff, 1990; Holmes, 1993; Marino, 1993). This is potentially refreshing and
illuminating, a reminder that teaching the conflicts, after all, is hardly a new
idea. Observing contrasts, differences, and dialectical oppositions has long been
a staple of Western academic practice, especially in the liberal arts and philoso
phy. With this in mind, I invite a reconsideration of how the commonplaces of
ancient rhetoric were regarded a s artificial but useful common grounds for
d i s c u s s i n g a n d debating w i l d l y d i sparate mate ri a l s , i ss u e s , a n d b e l i e f s .
Reappraising the rhetorical commonplaces o f classical rhetoric included, how
ever, not just difference and contrast, but similarity and comparison, not just
dialectic understood as opposing propositions, but dialectic understood as dia
logical truth seeking. The value of common places-in the larger cultural sense
cannot be underestimated in today ' s academy. The commonplaces o f antiquity
can help nurture this belief. They are ancient and were at their inception under
stood as artificial; they have already proven themselves in the long test of time,
amid the constantly shifting cultures and languages of the academy.
Humanistic education has since the time of the first rhetorical commonplaces
been based on the belief that learning critical thought through skepticism and
debate prepares individuals to prove, perfect, and defend their views and beliefs
in an ongoing dialectical examination. John Henry Cardinal Newman's 19th
century essay, "The Idea of a U niversity" ( 1982), extended this concept for one
of the first times in modern times to incorporate the reading of modern litera
tures as part of a l arger process of criticism directed at humanistic understanding
throughout the university. Newman ' s discussion is a welcome reminder that hu
manistic study and education have been considered cultural criticism for well
over a century. Criticism should be taught and learned, he proposes, through read
ing literature as itself a criticism of culture. The canonical literary authors many
would dispense with today-Dickens, Eliot, Twain , Thoreau-were i n their own
time political activists, critics outside the academy of the dominant culture that
the academy in their day did not address. Newman and others defended the study
of the literature of diverse cultures within the academy as a way of reinstating
human ism's role as cultural criticism that would promote values-beliefs about
what it is to be human-from within an academy that had become desiccated by
other kinds of criticism, science, and philology.
The political and ethical beliefs defended in Newman's "Idea of a Univer
sity" c learly hearken back to his classical training but are adapted to modern
goals. For a multicultural (as we say today) society to exist, both differences and
commonalities among peoples must be recognized. Education should seek to
re-comprehend the diversity of human cultures in order to promote a belief in
tolerance and respect. And it should establish as a basic premise-a fundamental
intellectual axiom and belief-that tolerance and respect are impossible without
knowledge (Gates, 1992, p. 37). Said ( 1 99 1) defines this double purpose of the
academy as a dialectic in which d iscovery is directed at transformation: "In the
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joint di scovery of self and other, it is the role of the academy to transform what
might be conflict, o r contest, o r a s sertion i n to reconci liation, mutuali ty, recogni
tion, creative interaction" (pp. 1 7- 1 8) . These are noble, decidedly attractive, fa
mili ar, and even pious goals. They are not, however, goals or activities that con
form to today 's paradigms of academic skepticism and programmatic doubt. On
what basis can reconcil i ation , mutuali ty, recognition, and creative i n teraction be
establi shed as common ground in the midst of contemporary literary and episte
mological theories that regard common ground and i ts pursuit a s politically out
dated and ethically i ncorrect? The most recent movement in the academy, ob
served by many with dismay, is a concerted movement, often under the aegis of
multiculturalism and teaching the conflicts, toward balkanizing academic disci
plines and cultures into s m aller and smaller warring fac tions.
I s there room i n the decidedly Western elite civic and academic tradition for
both forging and discovering the common beliefs on which goals l i ke mutuali ty
and creative interaction can be p.ursued? I hope we can begin to a s k thi s question
without apology. What does i t mean t o read with the eyes of faith-in this sense
in the academy, and what can the academy teach the eyes of faith? Liberal arts
humanism and a civic-minded academy have often manifested a certain tension
between the roles of paragon and gadfly, exemplar and cultural critic, between
the aspirations to teach creativity a nd originality and the responsibility to defi n e
standards o f t a s t e and correctne s s (White, 1 985). Simi larly, t h e academy and
culture alike have tolerated a commendable range of s tyles and goals among
writers, artists, and c ritics, some of whom define themselves a s makers and
readers of li terary art and others who define themselves a s exponents of particu
lar poli tical agendas. I advocate the study and production of literary and critical
wri ting that directly addre s s e s social i ssues a s well a s that which does not.
Howe ver, curre n t practice seems to be a bit more polarized and doctrinaire. Some
critical voices teach partisan political commentary; i n other quarters critical and
theoretical equivocation has led some of the best and brightest critical minds to
retreat from commitment to specific positions, and to refrain from morally based
action o n theoretical grounds . "It is as if someone in a position of power were to
i s sue a policy statement focusing solely on the difficulties of arriving at a policy
or to decline doing anything because any action, might, in certain instance s , b e
doctrinaire" (Torgovnick, 1 993, p. 54).
Where Marxist cultural critics such as Gerald Graff have erred in confusing
the description of partisan, reductive, and polarized academic theories with teach
ing to theorize (Ph e l p s , 1 992), cautious deconstructionists such a s Geoffre y
Hartman ( 1 99 1 ) err with similar effect b y creating a false dichotomy between
decons truction and political o r engaged criticism, as if to say that these two very
different activities cannot occupy the same academic space. Graff's ( 1 990) prac
tice exemplifies what Hartman ( 1 99 1 ) thinks of as theoretical fund amentalism.
I have proposed that a larger, dialectical relationship can be resuscitated
to help redefine such opposi tion s, a double vis ion of their nature and value.
One less reductive, less polarized alternative resides in the model of the m i nd as
spirit, and of belief a s the result of reasoned conviction (Kinneavy, 1 987). B elief
and faith - s u s t a i n i n g pr actices o f k n o w i n g , learn i n g , and t e a c h i n g provide
antidotes to overly psychologized notions of writing and textual interpretation
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a s inevitably fragmentary, eternally incomplete, merely personal, and exclusively
therapeutic. Intellectual practices guided by belief, for exampl e, enhance the
abil ity to c omprehend diversity as a unity, just as the quest for difference
inevitably succeeds. The most dispassionate analysis, Kierkegaard and for that
matter Plato l ong ago recognized, is in the end always directed by interests and
purposes, passions and beliefs. Kierkegaard's deliberately personal forms of
philosophizing (Mackey, 197 1) were designed to provide instructive, edifying
examples of philosophy as comprising mu ltiple genres and fostering tolerance
for many varieties of self while still retaining a common language and common
goals. One of his titles, Either/Or, emphasizes that we choose to believe, in
different situations and with different purposes, in the disjunctive either or the
potentia l l y less divisive conjunction, or.
Skepticism, criticism, and debate, regardless of the value that is assigned
them by their diverse reformers and adversaries, remain distinctly Western.
Definitive of academic discourse, these modes of knowing and speaking evolved
from agonistic male-to-male rhetorical traditions within the academy and on the
platforms of public political debate (Ong, 1992; Wills, 1990). It is increasingly
c l ear that debate in this liberal and humane tradition has been sanctioned
primarily for and by those in positions of power (Holmes, 1993). Women and
minorities have until recently not been permitted to dispute, to debate, or even
to speak on the public p l atform. Oddly enough, through similar r u l es of
enfranchi s e m en t , parti c u l ar l y i n the U . S. where church and state are so
rigorously segregated, r e ligion has often been excluded from public debate
and indeed has been cast as the enemy and not as the ally of education, liberal
humanism, and the pursuit of know l e dge (Carter, 1 99 3 ; Hol m e s , 1 99 3 ;
Wills, 1990).
It is a great irony that the denunciation of secular humanism currently
propounded by the religious right necessarily appeals to the larger humanist value
of open public debate. The irony is only compounded by a doctrinaire denuncia
tion of any and all religion in the public place by academicians who want their
doctrines of culture, society, and identity to receive equal time not only in the
academy but in the public sphere as well . The conventions-the values and the
beliefs-that govern the public presence and power of alternative voices is slowly
changing. Let us continue to broaden the bases of tolerance and understanding
for the many kinds of voices that are now seeking to sing together, to forge com
mon values out of newly discovered common beliefs, and together make just a
few simple leaps of faith. c<2J
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